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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are presented with the question of when a federal 
official is entitled to "qualified immunity" in a Bivens-based1 
civil action for damages. Because we conclude that the 
District Court erred in denying Defendant the protection of 
qualified immunity, we will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
This litigation centers around an investigation into drug 
trafficking activities in the Dominican Republic. 
Plaintiffs/Appellees are agents of the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General's Office who were involved in the drug 
investigation. In 1997, Plaintiffs filed a Bivens suit against 
Defendant/Appellant Michael Stiles ("Stiles"), then United 
States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
The Complaint alleged that Stiles violated Plaintiffs' first 
amendment rights and fifth amendment due process rights, 
and violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. S 1981. Plaintiffs 
also filed a civil rights action against members of the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office ("PAG" Defendants), 
including Pennsylvania Attorney General Michael Fisher 
("Fisher"), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.SS 1981 and 
1983. The original Complaint is long, prolix, and somewhat 
difficult to discern. However, the various causes of action 
were grounded in factual assertions that Defendants 
intentionally impeded Plaintiffs' criminal investigation and 
caused adverse employment conditions for Plaintiffs 
because Defendants wished to protect the Dominican drug 
organization. This appeal only involves the allegations 
against Stiles. 
 
Stiles moved to dismiss the Complaint for non- 
compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The 
Magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 
S.Ct. 1999 (1971). 
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the Motion to Dismiss be granted. The District Court 
adopted the Magistrate's Recommendations and dismissed 
the case against Stiles, noting that Stiles was entitled to 
"absolute prosecutorial immunity." The case against the 
PAG Defendants was also dismissed because it failed to 
state viable claims and because the suit was barred by the 
11th amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
In an unpublished opinion, a panel of this Court 
reversed. See McLaughlin v. Watson, No. 99-3087, (Sept. 
21, 1999) ("McLaughlin I"). The Panel held that Plaintiffs 
were entitled to amend their Complaint to state a first 
amendment cause of action against the PAG defendants 
and an "administrative" cause of action against Stiles. Id. at 
3-4. The Panel explained that while Plaintiffs' Complaint 
was "not a model of clarity," the Complaint suggested that 
Stiles used his influence as a United States Attorney to 
"obtain adverse personnel actions" against Plaintiffs. Id. at 
3. The Panel further explained: 
 
       As we made clear in Carter v. City of Philadelphia, [181 
       F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 1999)], prosecutorial immunity is 
       restricted to prosecutorial--as distinguished from 
       administrative--functions. Administrative decisions, 
       including those regarding the employment or 
       supervision of personnel outside the prosecutor's office, 
       are not subject to absolute prosecutorial immunity. 
       Because [U.S. Attorney] Stiles was not clearly entitled 
       to prosecutorial immunity from all of the claims 
       against him, the analysis for whether the Agents state 
       a cause of action against Stiles should proceed along 
       the same lines as for the PAG Defendants. 
 
Id. at 4. 
 
Pursuant to the Panel's suggestion in McLaughlin I, 
Plaintiffs amended their Complaint, which now included 
three counts.2 In Count I, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that the Amended Complaint is--like the initial 
Complaint--less than clear as to what precise  constitutional violations 
are actually being alleged against Stiles. We will, however, interpret the 
allegations in the Amended Complaint's language giving every benefit to 
Plaintiffs. 
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(both PAG and Stiles) impaired Plaintiffs' "terms and 
conditions" of employment via adverse "administrative" 
personnel action. According to Count I, Plaintiffs' rights 
were violated because Stiles and the PAG Defendants: 
 
       [impaired] where [Plaintiffs] could work, how much 
       they were required to travel to the point of extreme 
       hardship causing serious and painful medical 
       consequences, loss of promotional opportunities, and 
       subsequent wages, shift differentials and overtime and 
       career damaging evaluation reports. 
 
App. at 234. According to the Amended Complaint, these 
actions breached Plaintiffs' "federally guaranteed rights to 
be free of irrational and injuries [sic] administrative actions 
for the proper performance of their duties. . . ." 
 
Count II of the Amended Complaint alleged that 
Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their right to"substantive 
due process" by subjecting them to unfair treatment in 
their public employment. Count II further alleged that 
Defendants acted against Plaintiffs solely because of "their 
successful efforts to investigate [the Dominican] criminal 
wrongdoing." Id. at 235. 
 
Count III of the Amended Complaint alleged that 
Defendants violated Plaintiffs' first amendment rights by 
preventing Plaintiffs from responding to negative comments 
about Plaintiffs contained in certain press releases. 
According to the Amended Complaint: "the PAG defendants 
are still unlawfully enforcing today [their order to Plaintiffs] 
not to respond to the press in any form, or answer any 
charges in any forums." App. at 236. 
 
Stiles moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint based 
on qualified immunity or, in the alternative, for summary 
judgment. The summary judgment part of the motion 
argued that there was no issue of fact as to whether Stiles 
acted administratively against Plaintiffs. In a Memorandum 
Opinion dated July 6, 2000, the District Court denied 
Stiles' Motion to Dismiss with the following language: 
 
       Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified 
       immunity. I find it premature to determine this issue in 
       defendant's favor. There is a first amendment claim 
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       asserted against defendant. That is a clearly 
       established constitutional right, which, if interfered 
       with by defendant's use of influence with plaintiffs' 
       employer, would nullify the availability of qualified 
       immunity. 
 
The Motion for Summary Judgment was denied because 
the District Court concluded that "there is a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether actions taken by defendant 
caused adverse employment decisions to be made 
concerning the plaintiffs. . . ."3 Stiles now appeals again to 
this Court, solely on the qualified immunity issue. 
 
II. 
 
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291; see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151 
(1995); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806 
(1985). We review a motion to dismiss based on the defense 
of qualified immunity de novo as it involves a pure question 
of law. Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citing Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1020 
(3d Cir. 1992)). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court based this conclusion on deposition testimony 
regarding a meeting that took place between Stiles and Fisher in August, 
1998. The meeting apparently involved the results of an investigation 
being conducted by Stiles' office regarding allegations of improper 
conduct by Plaintiffs in their investigatory duties. At this meeting, 
Stiles 
informed Fisher that he would not prosecute any cases investigated by 
Plaintiffs. Additionally, Fisher and Stiles discussed the possibility of 
an 
"FBI/US Attorney operation" leasing space in the same Philadelphia 
office building (the "Essington Avenue" Office) that housed 
Pennsylvania's Bureau of Narcotics Investigation ("BNI"). According to 
Fisher's deposition, Stiles said that the United States Attorney's Office 
and the FBI would "continue[ ] to have problems" dealing with "BNI at 
Essington Avenue so long as any of the [plaintiffs] continue to be housed 
at Essington Avenue." Reacting to this statement by Stiles, Fisher wrote 
a note that read: "Personnel Problems--FBI/U.S. Atty Assignment," 
accompanied by the words, "need them [Plaintiffs] out of Essington." 
Fisher further stated in his deposition that Stiles promised to provide 
witnesses against Plaintiffs if they filed a grievance following their 
reassignment. Fisher also indicated that the Attorney General's Office 
would "check out" Philadelphia Police Department employees with the 
FBI before they moved into Essington Avenue. 
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The contours of the doctrine of "qualified immunity" are 
well-delineated and its underlying rationale has been 
clearly pronounced. As the Supreme Court explained, 
"permitting damages suits against government officials can 
entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear 
of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will 
unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 
3038 (1987). Courts have accommodated this concern"by 
generally providing government officials performing 
discretionary functions with a `qualified immunity,' 
shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their 
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with 
the rights they are alleged to have violated." Id.; see Malley 
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986). 
 
"One of the purposes of [qualified] immunity . . . is to 
spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but 
unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those 
defending a long drawn out lawsuit." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 
U.S. 226, 237, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991). Doctrinally 
speaking, qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit 
rather than a mere defense to liability; and like absolute 
immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously 
permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 (1985) (emphasis in original); 
see Siegert, 500 U.S. at 226, 111 S.Ct. at 1794. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, "qualified immunity" affords 
"protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law." Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 
S.Ct. at 1096. The rule supports "the need to protect 
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and 
the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous 
exercise of official authority." In Re City of Philadelphia 
Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 960 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732 (1982) 
(citations omitted)). 
 
In order to defeat an assertion of qualified immunity, a 
plaintiff must allege that the official violated a"clearly 
established" right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 635, 107 S.Ct. at 
3038. A plaintiff does not fulfill this requirement simply by 
alleging the defendant violated some constitutional 
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provision. Rather, "the right the official is alleged to have 
violated must have been `clearly established' in a more 
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense." Anderson, 
483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039 (emphasis added). As 
this Court explained, "clearly established rights" are those 
with contours sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates that right. 
A plaintiff need not show that the very action in question 
has previously been held unlawful, but needs to show that 
in light of preexisting law the unlawfulness was apparent. 
Shea v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 130 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations 
omitted). 
 
In determining whether an official violated a clearly 
established right, the Court first must ask whether a 
plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at 
all, D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 
972 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Siegert, 111 
S.Ct. at 1793), and, if so, then go on to examine whether 
the right was "clearly established." Id.  This Court has 
interpreted the phrase "clearly established" to mean "some 
but not precise factual correspondence" between relevant 
precedents and the conduct at issue, and that "[a]lthough 
officials need not predic[t] the future course of 
constitutional law, they are required to relate established 
law to analogous factual settings." Ryan v. Burlington 
County, 860 F.2d 1199, 1208-09 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 1745 (1989) (quoting 
People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 
747 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1984)). The essential inquiry is 
whether a reasonable official in the defendant's position at 
the relevant time "could have believed, in light of clearly 
established law, that [his or her] conduct comported with 
established legal standards." Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. 
Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 797 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Stoneking 
v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044, 110 S.Ct. 840 (1990)). 
 
III. 
 
Stiles argues that he is entitled to "qualified immunity" 
on all three counts in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. More 
specifically, Stiles asserts that the District Court erred by 
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not following the requisite analytical framework for 
assessing a "qualified immunity" claim and that--had the 
District Court performed the correct analysis--the Court 
would have had to grant the motion to dismiss. Along these 
lines, Stiles asserts that Plaintiffs have not alleged 
violations of any federal rights and, therefore, could not 
prove violations of any "clearly established" rights. 
Defendant posits that Plaintiffs have, at best, alleged 
violations of "garden variety" state employment law claims. 
 
Plaintiffs' appellate Brief offers no substantive response 
to the "qualified immunity" arguments raised by Stiles. 
Rather, Plaintiffs' theory of the case, as explained in their 
Brief, is that "[t]his appeal is no more than a re-submission 
of the same issues that were before the Court previously [in 
McLaughlin I]." Plaintiffs' Brief at 6 ("Summary of 
Argument"). As such, Plaintiffs label Stiles' appeal a "poorly 
disguised misnamed motion to vacate and reconsider." Id. 
Plaintiffs' apparent contention is that this Court already 
conclusively decided the issue of qualified immunity against 
Stiles in McLaughlin I. 
 
We reject Plaintiffs' contention that the qualified 
immunity issue was already decided by this Court in 
McLaughlin I. A careful reading of that case reveals that the 
panel decided only that Stiles was not necessarily entitled 
to absolute immunity on all claims. The Court did not 
address the completely distinct doctrine of qualified 
immunity. See id. at 3-4. 
 
Furthermore, we agree with Defendant that the District 
Court erred in summarily dispensing with the qualified 
immunity issue in favor of Plaintiffs. As discussed above, 
the analytical framework that a court must use in 
addressing a "qualified immunity" argument is well-settled 
in this Circuit. The court cannot--as the District Court 
essentially did here--stop with a conclusory statement that 
Stiles' alleged use of "influence with plaintiffs' employer" 
violated the first amendment. Rather, the District Court 
must go one step further and determine whether the facts 
alleged by plaintiffs violated a "clearly established right." 
This necessarily entails an analysis of case law existing at 
the time of the defendant's alleged improper conduct. 
Without such an analysis there is no way to determine if 
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the defendant should have known that what he or she was 
doing was constitutionally prohibited. See In Re City of 
Philadelphia Litg., 49 F.3d at 961 (if the law is not 
established clearly when an official acts, he is entitled to 
qualified immunity because he "could not reasonably be 
expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor 
could he fairly be said to `know' that the law forbade 
conduct not previously identified as unlawful.") (quoting 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738). In other 
words, there must be sufficient precedent at the time of 
action, factually similar to the plaintiff's allegations, to put 
defendant on notice that his or her conduct is 
constitutionally prohibited. Although the District Court 
seemed to be aware of the appropriate test, see  App. at 6 
n.1, it did not adequately apply the test to this case. 
 
We see no need to remand the case. Even assuming as 
true Plaintiffs' allegations, we cannot say that Stiles--at the 
time he acted--violated any "clearly established" 
constitutional right. Notably, Plaintiffs' Brief fails to 
mention even one case in this Circuit or elsewhere to 
suggest that Stiles violated a "clearly established" right.4 In 
fact, as explained above, Plaintiffs did not substantively 
respond at all in their Brief to Stiles' arguments regarding 
qualified immunity. Rather, Plaintiffs' Brief argued a 
different theory of the case altogether--that the qualified 
immunity issue had already been decided by this Court in 
McLaughlin I. As noted above, however, that reading of our 
prior opinion is incorrect. 
 
Moreover, our own review of the law existing at the time 
of Stiles' alleged conduct reveals that he had no reason to 
think that his alleged interaction with the Pennsylvania 
Attorney General violated Plaintiffs' "clearly established" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Plaintiffs fared no better in their Brief to the District Court in 
response 
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative for Summary 
Judgment. In the Motion to Dismiss, Stiles clearly asserted a "qualified 
immunity" defense. App. at 258. In responding to that Motion, Plaintiffs 
cited no case law--in existence at the time of Stiles' alleged conduct--to 
suggest violation of a "clearly established" right. See App. at 362-363. 
The District Court--although it refused to grant Stiles qualified 
immunity--also did not analyze the factual allegations against case law 
precedent. 
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constitutional rights. In Count I of the Amended Complaint, 
Plaintiffs allege that Stiles acted administratively to 
influence the Pennsylvania Attorney General to take 
adverse employment-related action against them. Although 
the Amended Complaint does not identify the specific 
source of any right Stiles may have violated, the District 
Court apparently construed Count I as a first amendment 
based retaliation claim. Nevertheless, even if we assume 
that Count I alleges a constitutional right, it does not 
demonstrate violation of one that is "clearly established." 
 
When a public official is sued for allegedly causing a 
third party to take some type of adverse action against 
plaintiff's speech, we have held that defendant's conduct 
must be of a particularly virulent character. It is not 
enough that defendant speaks critically of plaintiff or even 
that defendant directly urges or influences the third party 
to take adverse action. Rather, defendant must "threaten" 
or "coerce" the third party to act. Along these lines Stiles' 
Brief aptly directs us to our sister circuit's opinion in 
Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 
2000): 
 
       The nature of the [defendant's] retaliatory acts has 
       particular significance where the public official's acts 
       are in the form of speech. Not only is there an interest 
       in having public officials fulfill their duties, a public 
       official's own First Amendment speech rights are 
       implicated. Thus, where a public official's alleged 
       retaliation is in the nature of speech, in the absence of 
       a threat, coercion, or intimidation, intimating that 
       punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action will 
       follow, such speech does not adversely affect a citizen's 
       First Amendment rights even if defamatory. 
 
Id. at 687. 
 
At the time Stiles committed the alleged violations, the 
Third Circuit had already held that strongly urging or 
influencing, but not "coercing" a third party to take adverse 
action affecting a plaintiff's speech did not violate plaintiff's 
constitutional rights. R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New 
Hope, 735 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1984). In R.C. Maxwell, Plaintiff 
Maxwell leased space from Citibank in the Borough of New 
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Hope for the right to maintain commercial billboards. The 
Borough Council felt that the billboards negatively affected 
the town's "ambience" and wrote a strong letter to Citibank, 
urging it to have the billboards removed when plaintiff's 
lease expired. In that letter, the Borough expressly stated 
that it would be seeking legal remedies--such as drafting a 
zoning ordinance or dragging Citibank into litigation--if the 
billboards were not removed. Id. at 86-87. Citibank 
complied with the Borough's request, noting that its desire 
to stay in the Borough Council's "good graces" was a 
motivating factor in deciding not to allow Maxwell to 
maintain the billboards after expiration of the lease. Id. at 
87. 
 
Maxwell refused to remove the billboards and brought an 
action against the Borough for, among other causes of 
action, violation of its first amendment rights. In addition to 
damages, Maxwell sought a declaration that the Borough 
acted unlawfully in "coercing" Citibank to take action 
against it. Id. The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Borough and ordered it to remove 
the billboards within 15 days. Id. This Court affirmed. In 
addressing the first amendment claim, we explained that 
the Borough's actions did not amount to the type of serious 
"coercion" that would trigger a constitutional violation. Id. 
at 88-89. Moreover, the fact that Citibank acted in part 
because it wished to have a "receptive climate" within the 
Borough for future development projects did not alter our 
conclusion. Id. at 89. 
 
While not taking place specifically in the employment 
context, we believe that our Opinion in R.C. 
Maxwell--written well before Stiles' alleged interaction with 
the Pennsylvania Attorney General--provides relevant legal 
principles to guide us in this case. Stiles had no reason to 
believe that requesting or influencing another's employer to 
take adverse personnel action violated first amendment 
rights. We note in this regard that the alleged improper 
conduct itself took the form of speech--conversations with 
Fisher where Stiles allegedly influenced Fisher to take 
adverse action against Plaintiffs. Cf. X-Men Security, Inc. v. 
Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 68-70 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that 
public official's own right to free speech must also be 
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considered and that such rights are not necessarily 
subordinate to plaintiffs' free speech rights); Smith v. School 
District of Philadelphia, 112 F. Supp.2d 417, 431 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (school district's urging Home and School Association 
to remove plaintiff from his position as president of that 
association was itself a "protected right to free speech"); 
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. 
1300, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("[a]ttempts to persuade 
another to action are clearly within the scope of the First 
Amendment").5 
 
       IV. 
 
       For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the order of the 
District Court entered on July 7, 2000, and remand with 
instructions to dismiss all claims against Stiles. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5. Apparently, the District Court did not address the qualified immunity 
issue as it related to Counts II and III in the Amended Complaint. Like 
Count I, however, these claims cannot survive a qualified immunity 
defense. Count II is apparently based on The "Privileges and Immunities 
Clause" of the 14th Amendment. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 119 
S.Ct. 1518 (1999). Plaintiffs have not set forth facts that demonstrate a 
claim under this provision and certainly have not alleged violation of a 
"clearly established" right under this provision of the Constitution. To 
the extent that Count II alleges a substantive due process violation, we 
note that this Court already decided in McLaughlin I that Plaintiffs have 
no due process rights in their employment and we need not revisit that 
issue here. Count III alleges that Stiles violated Plaintiffs' first 
amendment rights because he "knew" that Plaintiffs' reputations were 
being attacked in the Press. Count III only implies, however, that it was 
the PAG Defendants--not Stiles--that ordered Plaintiffs' to remain silent 
in the face of these negative comments. As such, Count III does not 
allege a constitutional claim against Stiles, much less one that is 
"clearly 
established." 
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